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Abstract 
Hindsight bias is the well researched phenomenon that people falsely believe that they 
would have correctly predicted the outcome of an event once it is known. In recent years, 
several authors have doubted the ubiquity of the effect and have reported a reversal under 
certain conditions. This article presents an integrative model on the role of surprise as one 
factor explaining the malleability of the hindsight bias. Three ways in which surprise 
influences the reconstruction of pre-outcome predictions are assumed: (1) Surprise is used as 
direct metacognitive heuristic to estimate the distance between outcome and prediction. (2) 
Surprise triggers a deliberate sense-making process, and (3) also biases this process by 
enhancing the retrieval of surprise-congruent information and expectancy-based hypothesis 
testing. 
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Introduction 
In hindsight, there is little doubt that a certain soccer team would win a championship, or 
a certain financial investment would prove to be a success. But did we really predict this 
before the outcome was known to us? In many fields of judgment, this has to be doubted. The 
almost ubiquitous tendency of people to falsely believe that they would have correctly 
predicted the outcome of an event once the outcome is known is called hindsight bias (for 
meta-analyses see Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway, & 
Posavac, 2004).  
Since Fischhoff and his collaborators (e.g., Fischhoff, 1975, 1977; Fischhoff & Beyth, 
1975) first investigated this phenomenon in the mid-seventies, numerous studies on the 
hindsight bias have been reported (for reviews see Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Stahlberg & 
Maass, 1998). In sum, hindsight bias has been found in a wide variety of contexts and several 
studies have demonstrated its robustness vis-à-vis most attempts to reduce or eliminate it. For 
example, even if participants were carefully informed about the effect or asked to try not to 
fall prey to this bias, they were unable to ignore the outcome information (Fischhoff, 1975, 
1977). In their meta-analysis of 128 hindsight bias studies, Christensen-Szalanski and Willham 
(1991) found only six studies without a significant effect. 
In recent years, however, several authors have doubted the ubiquity of the hindsight bias 
phenomenon and have reported even a reversal of the hindsight bias under certain conditions. 
At least two conditions have been specified under which such a reversed hindsight bias can be 
expected: (1) A reversed hindsight bias has been postulated and demonstrated for outcomes 
that are perceived to be highly unexpected or unlikely from a foresight perspective (see 
Mazursky & Ofir, 1990; Ofir & Mazursky, 1997; Pezzo, 2003; Verplanken & Pieters, 1988). 
(2) A reversed hindsight bias has also been predicted and found when the outcome was of high 
personal relevance and at the same time highly self-threatening (see Louie, 1999; Louie, 
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Curren, & Harich, 2000; Mark & Mellor, 1991; Stahlberg, Hintz, & Schwarz, 2005; Stahlberg 
& Schwarz, 1999). The aim of this paper is to propose a new model explaining the role of 
surprise in hindsight bias, therefore, we will focus on the first condition, and previous research 
on this topic is reviewed in detail in the next paragraph.  
Differing views on the role of surprise 
In the early history of hindsight research, it was assumed that outcome information that is 
highly inconsistent with participants’ expectations would strengthen the hindsight bias 
(Fischhoff, 1975; Wood, 1978). The argument by Fischhoff and others was that highly 
unexpected outcomes will elicit a causal search to explain or make sense of that outcome in 
order to regain control and to render the world predictable. If information is inconsistent with 
expected outcomes, more cognitive effort is required to solve this sense-making task. During 
this process, many initial assumptions will be revised, resulting in greater changes in the 
cognitive structure regarding the outcome in question. Altogether, this more intensive sense-
making process, compared to processes elicited by expectancy-congruent outcomes, will result 
in stronger hindsight bias effects (Roese & Olson, 1997; Schkade & Kilbourne, 1991). In line 
with this view, several studies have shown that people in fact exhibit greater hindsight bias 
when confronted with difficult and misleading questions, and therefore, with presumably more 
surprising answers (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Fischhoff, 1977; Hoch & 
Loewenstein, 1989; Winman, 1997). 
More recently, however, other researchers have introduced an opposing view concerning 
the influence of surprise on the magnitude and direction of hindsight bias (see Mazursky & 
Ofir, 1990; Ofir & Mazursky, 1997; Renner, 2003; Verplanken & Pieters, 1988). These 
researchers argue that at least highly unexpected outcomes can lead to a reduced or even a 
“reversed” hindsight bias. Verplanken and Pieters were the first to assume that there may be a 
threshold of surprise where a “I knew it all along” (hindsight bias) judgment actually turns into 
Role of Surprise in Hindsight Bias     5 
a ”I could never have expected this to happen” judgment (reversed hindsight bias). The 
authors demonstrated this reversed hindsight bias in the context of the Chernobyl nuclear 
power accident in 1986. Although this first study has been criticized on methodological 
grounds, other studies using more clear-cut experimental methods have meanwhile 
accumulated further evidence for reversed hindsight biases (Hintz, Stahlberg, & Schwarz, 
2000; Mazursky & Ofir, 1990; Ofir & Mazursky, 1997; Pezzo, 2003; Stahlberg, Sczesny, & 
Schwarz, 1999; Whittlesea & Williams, 2001). 
Pezzo’s Sense-Making Model 
Following a profound analysis of the contradicting evidence regarding the role of surprise 
in hindsight bias, Pezzo (2003) offered an integrative model. Based on the differentiation 
between initial surprise (the spontaneous feeling that is elicited when a person is confronted 
with an unexpected outcome) and resultant surprise (the residual feeling that can remain after 
the sense-making process if this process was not entirely successful), Pezzo suggested that a 
certain amount of initial surprise is necessary to activate a sense-making process. Without 
such a sense-making process which leads to a restructuring of the cognitive system, no 
hindsight bias can be expected. If the outcome elicits enough initial surprise, sense-making 
will occur. This process will result in hindsight bias if it is successful. However, if the 
individual cannot make sense of this outcome, resultant surprise will prevail and a reversed 
hindsight bias will be the consequence.  
This model allows for the integration of most of the contradicting results regarding the 
role of surprise in hindsight bias. This can be demonstrated by looking at a series of 
experiments by Hoch and Loewenstein (1989). Their studies have been cited by some authors 
(e.g., Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Louie, 1999; Louie et al., 2000; Pohl, 1998) as evidence for 
the hypothesis that surprising outcomes (of difficult or misleading items) will result in less or 
even reversed hindsight bias and by others for the opposite hypothesis that surprising 
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outcomes will lead to a stronger hindsight bias (e.g., Pezzo, 2003). Interestingly, both 
positions are correct and the series of experiments offers evidence for both hypotheses. On the 
one hand, Hoch and Loewenstein found that difficult questions led to a stronger hindsight bias 
(overestimation of one’s own ability to answer the question correctly) in Experiments 1 to 3. 
On the other hand, when looking at the correlation between surprise ratings and hindsight bias, 
in Experiment 4 the authors found that surprise ratings about the outcome correlated 
negatively with the hindsight bias. Furthermore, Hoch and Loewenstein found in Experiment 5 
that for certain incremental, non-insight problems (e.g., anagram-like tasks), feedback led to a 
reversed hindsight bias while feedback in insight problems led to a strong hindsight bias. 
They, therefore, assumed (without having actually measured surprise in this experiment), that: 
“Subjects may simply not experience an appropriate level of surprise when they see the right 
answer to difficult insight problems” (p. 617). These seemingly contradicting results can easily 
be reconciled by the Pezzo model if we assume that difficult items lead to high initial surprise, 
whereas the measured surprise in Experiment 4 very likely assessed resultant surprise: Initial 
surprise is necessary to trigger the sense-making process but if this sense-making is not 
successful surprise should prevail and – as a consequence - hindsight bias should be 
attenuated. In line with these assumptions, difficult insight problems as in Hoch and 
Loewenstein’s Experiment 5, should be expected to produce strong hindsight bias (and low 
resultant surprise) although the person was initially surprised by the outcome because with 
insight problems the solution does make complete sense once you have seen it. 
Further supporting evidence for this model comes from Pezzo´s (2003) own empirical 
studies. In the first study, he analyzed the reactions of basketball fans towards the results of 
wins or losses of their own teams under two conditions that their own team was the visiting or 
the home team. It was predicted and found that winning the game was more expectancy-
congruent for the home-team fans than for the visiting-team fans. As predicted by the model, 
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expected events (the winning of the home team) resulted in no measurable hindsight bias 
whereas non-expected events (the winning of the visiting team) resulted in at least a 
marginally significant hindsight bias. In study 3, Pezzo was also able to show that by and large 
equally surprising outcomes (initial surprise) resulted in a strong hindsight bias when sense-
making was easy (e.g., regarding a research finding such as “`Looks are equally important to 
both men and women”) while no hindsight bias occurred when sense-making was difficult 
(e.g., “American students are less overconfident than Chinese”).  
The sense-making model of Pezzo has been able to integrate seemingly contradicting 
results and therefore has greatly enhanced our understanding of the role of surprise in 
hindsight bias. However, in this paper we will argue that this model can profit from integrating 
theoretical ideas about how subjective experiences can influence judgment and decision 
making.  
Surprise as Metacognitive Information and Surprise-Congruent Information Processing 
 Our model of surprise as metacognitive information extends Pezzo’s (2003) model in 
two important ways: Firstly, in Pezzo’s model surprise merely functions as a trigger for the 
sense-making process, however, it does not predict whether the person will show a hindsight 
bias, no hindsight bias or even a reversed hindsight bias. In the following we will argue that 
the feeling of surprise is used as metacognitive information to reconstruct the pre-outcome 
prediction. This should basically be the case under conditions that invite heuristic information 
processing. Based on current conceptions of prominent dual process models of judgment and 
decision making (e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Forgas, 2000; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), these 
conditions can be defined in terms of low motivation and/or low cognitive capacity to process 
information concerning the issues in question. Secondly, in Pezzo’s model no assumptions are 
made about how this sense-making process itself may be influenced by feelings of surprise. In 
our model, surprise is assumed to also lead to experience-congruent information processing by 
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initiating experience-congruent hypothesis testing. This latter process, however, is expected to 
be of importance only if people are sufficiently motivated and have enough cognitive capacity 
to process the relevant information. This prediction is again in line with dual process models 
of judgment and decision making.   
 These assumptions of the different routes in which surprise can influence the hindsight 
bias are based on the biased reconstruction approach to explain the hindsight bias (see 
Stahlberg, Eller, Maass, & Frey, 1995; Stahlberg & Maass, 1998; Schwarz & Stahlberg, 
2003). In line with other research in the field (e.g., Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998; Hoffrage, 
Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000; Pohl, Eisenhauer, & Hardt, 2003), the biased reconstruction 
approach states that people use the outcome information as a basis for reconstructing the 
original judgment when asked to remember it. In more detail, the biased reconstruction 
approach assumes that people asked to remember their original prediction after being informed 
about the actual outcome of an event, can either remember it or not. Those who do remember 
their original prediction are likely to reproduce it correctly. Those who have forgotten about 
their original prediction are forced to reconstruct their prediction or guess, and in the presence 
of outcome information, are likely to utilize this information as an anchor. Only the latter 
group who have forgotten their prediction, produce a hindsight bias. The magnitude and 
direction of the hindsight bias depends on people’s subjective assumptions about their 
predictive ability. Since people are generally overly optimistic about their abilities 
(Greenwald, 1980), in the majority of cases they will locate their presumed prior estimate 
closer to the real outcome (anchor) than it originally was, producing a hindsight bias. But, if 
they have reason to believe that the outcome was unpredictable (e.g., if they doubt their 
predictive abilities in a certain field of expertise), the hindsight bias might be reduced, non-
existent, or even reversed. Following this reasoning, each cue that informs people about the 
potential distance between the original judgment and the real outcome will affect the strength 
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and direction of hindsight bias. In the following we will argue that subjective experiences may 
play a major role in this process. Subjective experiences, such as the accessibility experience, 
the feeling of knowing, or the feeling of surprise can act as metacognitive cues (for an 
overview, see Bless & Forgas, 2000) that inform people about the most likely distance 
between original judgments and actual outcomes. We assume that people use the feeling of 
surprise as such a metacognitive cue to reconstruct their own predictions when they do not 
remember them.1 
The feeling of surprise as a direct metacognitive cue 
 The idea that people use cognitive subjective experiences like the feeling of surprise as 
metacognitive information about mental processes has been discussed in many domains of 
judgments and decision making (Bless & Forgas, 2000). Indeed, Koriat and Levy-Sadot 
(1999) proposed that cognitive experiences are meta-summaries of currently activated content 
or ongoing processes, boiling complex situational data down to single pieces of experiential 
information. So for example, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) considered the reliance on the 
accessibility experience (the experience of the “ease with which instances or associations 
could be brought to mind”, p. 208) in judgment formation as a heuristic strategy to make 
inferences about the frequency of information stored in our memory. In the context of 
hindsight bias, the influence of the accessibility experience was investigated by Sanna and his 
colleagues (Sanna & Schwarz, 2004, 2003; Sanna, Schwarz, & Small, 2002; Sanna, Schwarz, 
& Stocker, 2002). They doubted the recommendation of Fishhoff (e.g., 1982a, 1982b) and 
others (e.g., Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988; Davies, 1987; Nario & Branscombe, 
1995) that the generation of possible alternatives about the outcome is a way to reduce the 
hindsight bias. Sanna and colleagues assumed (and demonstrated) that this strategy would 
backfire when it is hard to come up with reasons for an alternative outcome and participants 
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would use this accessibility experience as a metacognitive cue in a (reversed) sense-making 
process and reconstruct their prediction of the outcome based on the result of this process.  
In a similar way, we assume that the feeling of surprise can act as a metacognitive cue. A 
strong feeling of surprise triggered by the presentation of the outcome signifies that a person 
did not expect that outcome. Therefore, he or she would assume that his or her prediction was 
far away from the actual outcome and, therefore, would be expected to show a low or even 
reversed hindsight bias when trying to reconstruct his or her initial prediction. As with other 
subjective experiences we assume that people use this information in a direct, heuristic 
fashion, allowing for fast and frugal information processing. This idea, that the feeling of 
surprise plays an important role as a predictor of the strength and direction of the hindsight 
bias, is – as we mentioned before - not entirely new to the hindsight bias literature. In fact, 
Mazursky and Ofir (1990) saw the feeling of surprise as responsible for their reversed 
hindsight bias findings. Similarly, Hoch und Loewenstein (1989) – as stated above -  argue 
that people are capable of using the feeling of surprise as information about the difficulty of 
the prediction task (for additional evidence see Louie, 1999; Whittlesea & Williams, 2001).  
We are re-introducing this assumption into a model of the role of surprise on the hindsight 
bias and assuming that the feeling of surprise as a subjective experience is used as a direct 
heuristic metacognitive cue to estimate the distance between the actual outcome and the pre-
outcome prediction that is not retrievable any more. The stronger the feeling of surprise, the 
higher the assumed distance between outcome and pre-outcome prediction would be. This 
would result in a reduced or even reversed hindsight bias. But we are not only re-introducing 
this idea into a theoretical model, we will also argue that to test this prediction, new forms of 
experimental designs are needed that allow us to show that it is really the experience of 
surprise that is used as a metacognitive cue. These designs must be able to disentangle the 
experience or feeling of surprise from information content as is outlined below. The 
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experiments that we will describe later on in this paper will propose such an experimental 
design and will offer support for this main assumption of our model. However, before this is 
done we will elaborate on the second theoretical assumption of our model. 
Effects of the feeling of surprise on the sense making process 
 In the following we will elaborate on the idea that the feeling of surprise is also used in 
the deliberative process of sense-making. In our opinion surprise serves not only as a trigger to 
elicit the sense-making process when a certain threshold is reached (as assumed by Pezzo, 
2003; see above). We would rather assume that the strength of the feeling of surprise will also 
influence what kind of initial hypothesis on the likely outcome of the sense-making process 
will be tested. In other words, the experience of surprise can initiate the biased testing of the 
hypothesis that the outcome makes no sense. People often limit themselves to test a single 
hypothesis (e.g., Bruner & Postman, 1951; Sanbonmatsu, Posavac, Kardes, & Mantel, 1998) 
and the testing process is often focused on hypothesis-consistent information (e.g., Frey, 1986; 
Klayman & Ha, 1987). Taking these findings into account, the likelihood of a sense-making 
judgment congruent with the initial feelings of surprise is high. However, note that it is not 
assumed that the sense-making process following a strong feeling of surprise must inevitably 
lead to the conclusion that the outcome does not make sense (and will therefore lead to a 
reduced or reversed hindsight bias). A strong feeling of surprise only increases the likelihood 
of surprise-congruent judgments (in this case a weak or even reversed hindsight bias). In many 
situations, a plausible explanation for the outcome will come to mind (and lead to a strong 
hindsight bias) even when the person was initially surprised by the outcome. So, for example, 
people solving insight problems (for example in Experiment 5 by Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989, 
see above), often get a highly surprising solution (outcome) that, however, is perceived as very 
plausible from a hindsight perspective. In such a situation, the direct heuristic usage of the 
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feeling of surprise and the sense-making process will have opposing influences on the 
reconstruction of the pre-outcome prediction. 
The two routes by which surprise can influence the hindsight bias 
In sum, we assume that surprise as metacognitive information can influence the 
magnitude and direction of hindsight bias via two different routes and in the following three 
distinct ways: (1) Feelings of surprise can function as a direct metacognitive heuristic cue that 
signifies whether one has or has not predicted the outcome, (2) surprise will trigger the 
deliberate process of sense-making when it reaches a certain threshold, and (3) surprise will 
also bias this sense-making process. This process can either result in a successful sense-
making (no resultant surprise) or in a less successful sense-making (high resultant surprise). 
The amount of resultant surprise can then again be used as a metacognitive cue that affects the 
strength of the hindsight bias and is not assumed to be only a mere by-product of the sense-
making process, as in the Pezzo model. 
Introducing a direct, heuristic and a more deliberate route via sense-making in which 
feelings of surprise are expected to affect the reconstruction of the pre-outcome prediction also 
leads to specific assumptions about the differential strength of these routes in different 
situations. Based on general assumptions of prominent dual-process theories of judgment and 
decision making (e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the research on 
subjective experiences (e.g., Forgas, 2000), it is assumed that the direct, heuristic influence of 
surprise is strongest if people are under motivational or capacity constraints. The sense-
making process, however, will have the highest influence on the strength and direction of the 
hindsight bias when people are motivated and capable to integrate given information in a more 
deliberative way. Furthermore, given that people use the feeling of surprise as metacognitive 
information we can assume that they can control the use of this information in the judgment 
formation process, meaning, that they can disregard the information if it is not seen as 
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diagnostic. This assumption, however, does not mean that this judgment formation process is 
always conscious. Pezzo (2003) stated rightly that it is possible that surprise can elicit the 
sense-making process unconsciously. Based on the research on other subjective experiences 
we can assume that while the interpretation of the feeling of surprise in principle is 
metacognitive and learned (on the learned interpretation of subjective cognitive experiences, 
see Unkelbach, 2006) in most situations the usage of the feeling is automatic and unconscious 
(e.g., Whittlesea & Williams, 2001). The sense-making process, however, is a deliberate and 
effortful process that requires conscious monitoring.  
The need to disentangle feelings of surprise from the content 
of the outcome and potential cues to sense-making  
To test the basic assumption of our model that it is the subjective experience of surprise 
(the feeling of surprise) that is responsible for reduced or reversed hindsight bias one has to 
come up with an experimental manipulation that allows varying the feeling of surprise 
independently from subjects’ prior expectations and the content information of the outcome. In 
all hindsight-surprise studies up to date, surprise was manipulated by varying the content 
information of the outcome or by influencing participants’ expectations. This procedure 
always confounds the feeling of surprise with specific features of the content (e.g., the 
potential for sense-making, the number of pro- and counter-arguments that can be generated 
etc.) or of the judging person. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that these specific features of 
the content dimension or the judging person rather than the experience of surprise are the main 
influencing factors responsible for reduced or reversed hindsight biases concerning highly 
unexpected outcomes. An experimental design that allows for the strongest test of the 
influences of surprise on hindsight bias therefore calls for a paradigm in which the experience 
of surprise can be induced while holding constant (1) the content of outcome information and 
(2) initial expectations and thereby also the potential for sense-making. 
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We were able to design such a paradigm based on the work of Reisenzein and his 
colleagues (Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 1997; Niepel, Rudolph, Schützwohl, & Meyer, 
1994; Reisenzein, 2000a, 2000b; Reisenzein & Ritter, 2000).  The basic idea of Reisenzein´s 
Interference Theory of Surprise is: 
(…) that the experience of surprise is based, at least in part, on a sensation-like form of 
awareness (…) of the interference with ongoing mental activity caused by surprising 
events. Because this feeling is a nonconceptual or nonpropositional form of awareness of 
the workings of the cognitive mechanisms engaged in surprise, it can be called a 
`metacognitive´ (Clore, 1992) or `metarepresentational´ (Reisenzein, 2000a, b) feeling. 
(Reisenzein & Ritter, 2000, p. 3)  
This assumption implies that the same information should be experienced as more surprising 
when presented on the background of a cognitively demanding task compared to an easy task. 
Interference should be more pronounced in the first condition. In order to test this idea, 
Reisenzein and Ritter varied the cognitive load of a task that was then interrupted by the 
surprising event. In the low-load (high-load) condition participants had to calculate 3 one-digit 
(two-digit) numbers as quickly as possible. The surprising event was presented during the 25th 
trial when suddenly the mode of presentation changed (color of background and numbers and 
an extra tone). At the end of the calculation task, participants rated the surprise as a 
consequence of the change of presentation mode and of their feelings of interference (“How 
strongly did the change of the stimulus presentation `throw you off the track´ of the addition 
task?”). Results supported the Interference Theory of Surprise: Participants reported stronger 
experiences of surprise and stronger feelings of interference under high than under low 
cognitive load. 
Empirical evidence for the Surprise as Metacognitive Information Model 
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In our own work (Müller & Stahlberg, 2006), we adapted the idea of Reisenzein and his 
colleagues in a hindsight dual task paradigm and created a situation where participants were 
led to misattribute the feeling of surprise triggered by the presentation of the outcome to its 
content. Outcome information was presented on the background of a highly demanding 
cognitive task versus a less-demanding task in a hypothetical hindsight bias design. It was 
assumed that participants would experience more surprise triggered by the presentation of the 
outcome on the background of a highly demanding task, and would attribute this feeling of 
surprise to the special outcome content. Therefore, they should show less hindsight bias than 
participants in the non-demanding task. By using the same stimuli in both groups, the content 
of the stimuli and the expectations were held constant and only the differential strength of the 
feeling of surprise could explain differences in the anticipation task between experimental 
conditions. 
In all three experiments the same basic experimental procedure was used: We told 
participants that they would take part in a “color prediction task”. They should pursue two 
different tasks simultaneously: The first task was to sum up three numbers which 
consecutively appeared on the screen for 1500 ms each (manipulation of cognitive demand 
that was very similar to the procedure of Reisenzein & Ritter, 2000). Each of these numbers 
was presented on a colored square (participants knew the color of the squares could be yellow, 
orange, red, green and blue and that the same color could appear several times in a trial). The 
second task (outcome prediction) was to predict the color of the final fourth square (without a 
number) that would appear in a random order after the presentation of the three numbers in 
half of the trials instead of the sum entrance screen. Participants were told that the colors of 
the squares on which the numbers appeared followed certain rules, that they were to predict, 
the color sequences, however, were in fact completely random. After participants had seen the 
final square, they were asked how surprised they were by the color of the square, if they had 
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predicted this color and how certain they were about this. While the trials with the fourth 
colored squares were the experimental trials, the sole purpose of the sum-entry-trials was to 
make sure that participants engaged in the cognitive load manipulation and were under low (or 
high) cognitive demand when the fourth colored square appeared (because they could not 
discriminate the two tasks until the sum-entry screen or the fourth colored square appeared and 
therefore had to calculate the sum even in the trials where a fourth colored square appeared). 
Being under low (or high) cognitive demand should make them experience less (or more) 
interference caused by the occurrence of the square which they should attribute to the low (or 
high) surprise elicited by the color of the square. Note, however, that cognitive demand was 
the same for both groups when giving their judgments after the colored square, because both 
groups knew that they would not need to type in the sum in these trials and therefore had 
stopped calculating at that point. The order of the trials was randomly chosen. Figure 1 depicts 
all four trial types and their structure. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
 In Experiment 1 each participant passed 12 trials with double-digit numbers (high-
surprise-about-outcome trials) and in 12 trials with single-digit numbers (low-surprise-about-
outcome trials). In half of these trials, participants had to type in the sum at the end of the trial, 
while in the other half, they were shown a fourth colored square. The prediction and certainty 
ratings that followed the presentation of the fourth colored square were combined into a 
measure of hindsight bias. In line with the hypothesis, participants rated the occurrence of a 
color as more surprising for the trials in the high-surprise-about-outcome condition than for 
the trials in the low-surprise-about-outcome condition. As predicted by our model, participants 
showed less hindsight bias (less certainty about predicting the color) in the high-surprise-
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about-outcome trials than in the low-surprise-about-outcome trials (see Table 1). Additional 
regression analyses showed that feelings of surprise mediated the effect of the surprise-
manipulation on the hindsight bias.  
In a second experiment, it was tested whether the effects of the direct, heuristic route 
would be stronger under time-constraints in the judgment phase. Time-constraints limit the 
mental capacity of the participants and therefore participants should rely more on heuristic 
cues in information processing. To test this assumption, we used a between-subjects design 
(participants always had either low- or high-surprise-about-outcome trials) in which half of the 
participants were told to make their judgments (how surprised they were by the color of the 
square, if they had predicted this color and how certain they were about this) after the 
presentation of the outcome as fast as possible (time-constraint condition), whereas the other 
half of the participants were told to take as much time as they needed for this task (no-time-
constraint condition). To test if the direct effect of surprise on the prediction of the outcome 
also holds when a measure of sense-making is included, participants additionally were asked, 
after each fourth colored square, how plausible the occurrence of this color was to them in this 
trial. As predicted by our model, participants in the time-constraint condition stated that they 
were more certain to have predicted the outcome in the low-surprise-about-outcome condition 
than in the high-surprise-about-outcome condition. Participants in the no-time-constraint 
condition did not show any significant differences in their prediction of outcome as a function 
of the surprise manipulation (significant interaction, see also Table 1). Additionally, a 
mediation analysis was conducted for the two time-constraint-conditions separately. As can be 
seen in Figure 2, the predicted partial meditation of the relationship between rated surprise 
about outcome and prediction of outcome by plausibility of outcome was only found when 
participants had no time-constraints. However, when participants had time-constraints while 
making their judgments, surprise predicted plausibility ratings and prediction of outcome, but 
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plausibility of outcome did not predict the hindsight bias measure (prediction of outcome). 
This strongly indicates that surprise is directly used as a heuristic cue to estimate the distance 
between outcome and pre-outcome predictions, especially when time constraints are high. The 
influence of the result of the sense-making process, however, on the hindsight bias is strong 
only under no time constraint. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
In a third experiment, further hypotheses derived from our model were tested. Most 
prominently, the question whether the use of surprise can be controlled by the participants was 
examined. Based on previous research on subjective experiences, it is assumed that people use 
the feeling of surprise as metacognitive information only if the feeling is seen as diagnostic 
(e.g., Sanna & Schwarz, 2003). It was therefore assumed that surprise will only be used as a 
metacognitive cue if participants attribute the feeling of surprise to the occurrence of the 
outcome.  
To test this assumption, we again used a between-subjects design in which half of the 
participants were warned about the non-diagnosticity of the feeling of surprise in this 
experimental setting. This was done by telling them in the introductory part of the experiment 
that people react with more surprise to events when solving cognitively demanding tasks. The 
other half of the participants received no such warning. As a second factor, surprise about 
outcome was manipulated in the same way as in Experiment 1 and 2. In line with our 
expectations, in the no-warning condition, participants in the high-surprise-about-outcome 
condition showed less hindsight bias than participants in the low-surprise-about-outcome 
condition. In the warning condition, there was no difference between high- and low-surprise-
about-outcome conditions on the hindsight bias measure (the interaction was significant, see 
also Table 1). Participants successfully discounted the feeling of surprise when they were 
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warned about its non-diagnosticity. Without warning, they used their feeling of surprise to 
reconstruct their prediction. 
As stated above, the Surprise as Metacognitive Information Model assumes that surprise 
cannot only be used as a direct cue in the judgment about the outcome predictability but can 
also be used as a cue in the sense-making process (“successful sense-making will be 
unlikely”). To test this hypothesis, participants in Experiment 3, as in Experiment 2, were 
asked to rate the plausibility of the fourth colored square. As predicted, the plausibility was 
significantly influenced by the surprise manipulation when participants were in the no-warning 
condition. In the high-surprise-about-outcome condition, plausibility of the color sequence 
was rated lower than in the low-surprise-about-outcome condition. No such difference was 
found in the condition where participants got a warning about the non-diagnosticity of the 
surprise feeling (significant interaction). As shown in Figure 3, mediation analysis revealed 
that plausibility as a measure of sense-making partly mediated the relationship of initial 
surprise with hindsight judgments in the no-warning condition.2 As expected, in the warning 
condition, surprise had no influence on the perceived plausibility and the prediction judgment.  
Altogether, Experiment 3 revealed that participants use the surprise feeling as a 
metacognitive cue in the reconstruction of the prediction only if the feeling of surprise is seen 
as a diagnostic cue. Furthermore, the sense-making process is not only triggered by the 
surprise feeling but also significantly influenced by this feeling. The mediation-analysis 
revealed a substantial direct effect of feelings of surprise as metacognitive information on the 
hindsight bias and also an indirect effect via a tainted sense-making process (in conditions 
without warning).  
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
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Conclusions 
The results of three experiments using our new paradigm support the predictions of the 
Surprise as Metacognitive Information Model. Most importantly, the hypothesis was 
confirmed that the feeling of surprise indeed influences the strength of the hindsight bias as a 
metacognitive cue. The results of the second experiment corroborate the idea that this feeling 
of surprise is used in a heuristic fashion and that its strongest effects on the reconstruction of 
the pre-outcome prediction occur under capacity constraints. Furthermore, Experiment 3 
showed that people are able to control the usage of the metacognitive cue of surprise when 
making judgments. Additionally, we assumed that feelings of surprise will taint the sense-
making process. When experiencing high surprise, participants are expected to selectively 
retrieve information from memory that stresses the low plausibility of the actual outcome. In 
the third experiment, we conducted a preliminary test of this hypothesis and found that, 
indeed, participants found the color sequences more implausible in the high-surprise condition 
(with no warning).  
All the three experiments reported here used the same experimental paradigm and the 
same dependent measures. In order to conduct a stronger test of the validity of our model, 
future research should use other, presumably physiological measures of surprise. Additional 
experimental data is needed to underscore the claim that the direct influence of the feeling of 
surprise is heuristic in nature and especially strong under mental constraints and low 
motivation. Furthermore, our data on the second prediction of our model that surprise biases 
the sense-making process is at this point only preliminary. Future research will have to 
propose better measures of successful sense-making or resultant surprise that show less 
conceptual overlap with the hindsight measure than our plausibility measures. Finally and 
most importantly, the above described experimental design is only able to detect a reduction in 
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hindsight bias. To test the claim of the model about the occurrence of a reversed hindsight bias 
under certain conditions more refined experimental setups are needed. 
Despite this list of needed experimental validations, the Surprise as Metacognitive 
Information Model, in our opinion, substantially contributes to our knowledge about the 
different routes via which the feeling of surprise can effect the malleability of the hindsight 
bias. It combines the idea that the feeling of surprise is used to reconstruct pre-outcome 
predictions (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989; Louie, 1999; Mazursky & Ofir, 1990; Ofir & 
Mazursky, 1997) with the idea of Pezzo (2003) about a sense-making process triggered by the 
feeling of surprise. By integrating both ideas in one model and including ideas from research 
on metacognitions and subjective experiences, the model allows for more precise predictions 
of the role of surprise in the reconstruction of pre-outcome predictions than previous models. 
It can therefore build a basis for many new research questions. 
Apart from the model itself, we hope that our new experimental paradigm, to disentangle 
feeling from content, might also inspire future research. In our opinion, this new paradigm 
could be a first step to disentangle the effects of the feeling of surprise from the content of the 
stimuli in a variety of other fields of decision making where surprise and expectations play a 
role (e.g., Mellers, 2000; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 
1999). 
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Footnotes 
 
 1 Since our paper focuses on the role of surprise, the potential role of other subjective 
experiences as metacognitive information is not discussed in detail. It is assumed that besides 
surprise and the mentioned accessibility experiences, other experiences and feelings can also 
influence the reconstruction of the original prediction. In fact, already Hoch and Loewenstein 
(1989) hypothesized that besides the feeling of surprise, the feeling of knowing and the feeling 
of familiarity could also function as signals to persons to assess their actual knowledge before 
the outcome was known. However, its high salience and its attributed diagnosticity will make 
the feeling of surprise in most situations the most prominent metacognitive cue for a person 
trying to reconstruct his or her own pre-outcome prediction. 
2 In all three experiments the outcome prediction and the surprise ratings were presented 
in random order. While in Experiments 1 and 2 the surprise measures was calculated from all 
surprise ratings, in Experiment 3 only surprise ratings that were asked before the outcome 
prediction questions were used to calculate the surprise measure. This was done to obtain a 
purer measure of initial surprise. 
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Table 1 
Means and standard deviations of prediction of outcome as a function of surprise about 
outcome (Experiment 1), surprise about outcome and time constraint (Experiment 2), and 
surprise about outcome and warning about low diagnosticity of surprise (Experiment 3) 
Experiment 1 
 Surprise about outcome 
 Low High 
 -1.80 (2.48) -2.67 (2.53) 
Experiment 2 
 Surprise about outcome 
Time constraint Low High 
Yes -0.89 (2.50) -2.70 (2.09) 
No -2.17 (1.83) -1.17 (2.57) 
Experiment 3 
 Surprise about outcome 
Warning about low 
diagnosticity of surprise Low High 
Yes -2.61 (2.60) -2.24 (2.04) 
No -1.26 (1.81) -2.94 (2.22) 
Note. Mean score is given, standard deviation is given in parentheses. Prediction of outcome ranges from -6 to 
+6; higher values indicate more certainty about the prediction of outcome. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1: Illustration of the different trial types and their structure. Low-surprise-about-
outcome trials consisted of one-digit numbers only. High-surprise-about-outcome trials 
consisted of two-digit numbers only. Sum-entry trials and color-prediction trials did not differ 
until after the presentation of the third colored square. In each trial the colored squares were 
presented for 1500ms on the screen each. The “…” represents the 1900 ms delay before the 
presentations of the next screen. The color of each square could be yellow, orange, red, green 
or blue. The color sequences were random, in one trial a color could appear several times. 
 
Figure 2: Mediational analysis for Experiment 2 (Müller & Stahlberg, 2006) with prediction 
of outcome as the dependent variable, plausibility of outcome as the mediator, and surprise by 
outcome (manipulation check measure) as the independent variable. Path coefficients are 
standardized beta coefficients from (multiple) regression analyses. The numbers in parentheses 
represent the direct effect (bivariate beta coefficients) of one of the two predictors (plausibility 
of outcome or surprise by outcome) on prediction of outcome prior to the inclusion of the 
other predictor. Numbers in italics represent the no-time-constraint condition while the bold 
numbers represent the time-constraint condition.*p < .05.**p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Figure 3: Mediational analysis for Experiment 3 (Müller & Stahlberg, 2006) with prediction 
of outcome as the dependent variable, plausibility of outcome as the mediator, and initial 
surprise by outcome (manipulation check measure) as the independent variable. Path 
coefficients are standardized beta coefficients from (multiple) regression analyses. The 
numbers in parentheses represent the direct effect (bivariate beta coefficients) of one of the 
two predictors (plausibility of outcome or initial surprise by outcome) on prediction of 
outcome prior to the inclusion of the other predictor. Numbers in italics represent the no-
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warning-about-low-diagnosticity condition while the bold numbers represent the warning-
about-low-diagnosticity condition.*p < .05.**p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Please 
enter sum.
Did you anticipate 
that the fourth 
square would have 
this color?
How certain are you 
about this assessment?
Did you anticipate 
that the fourth 
square would have 
this color?
How certain are you 
about this assessment?
34
4
34
4
...
...
...
...
87
7
87
7
...
...
...
...
53
3
53
3
...
...
...
...
Please 
enter sum.
...
...
high-surprise-
about-outome
sum-entry
high-surprise-
about-outome
color-prediction
low-surprise-
about-outome
sum-entry
low-surprise-
about-outome
color-prediction
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Surprise by 
Outcome 
Plausibility of 
Outcome 
 (Sense-Making) 
Prediction  
of Outcome 
(Hindsight Bias) -.66* (-.72***) 
-.27 (-.60***) 
-.85*** 
-.61*** 
.08 (.64***) 
.55** (.71***) 
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Initial Surprise by 
Outcome 
Plausibility of 
Outcome 
 (Sense-Making) 
Prediction  
of Outcome 
(Hindsight Bias) -.02 (-.04) 
-.29* (-.55***) 
-.03 
-.43** 
.57*** (.58***) 
.60*** (.71***) 
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